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Introduction 
 
The Friend and the Lay Sermons present the problem of how the employment 
relationship should be located within the public/private divide that operates in 
Constitutional theory.  This article is concerned with the question whether, in 
Coleridge’s thought, the low wages that caused the endemic poverty of the working 
poor engaged a role for the state, or whether the outcomes of contracting - the terms 
of the bargain between worker and employer - resided within an exclusively private 
realm with which the state should not, in principle, concern itself.
2
  If a role for the 
state was envisaged, how could that role be fulfilled?   
 
I shall argue that, whilst Coleridge’s Lay Sermons explicitly propounded three 
influences for moderating the disruptive potential of laissez-faire liberalism, there is 
elsewhere in Lay Sermons and The Friend the embryonic form of a fourth mechanism  
that he fails to locate within this typology of remedies. In this article I am principally 
concerned with the fourth possibility rather than the remedies that Coleridge explicitly 
prescribed. I shall not be concerned with Coleridge’s ideas on trade unionism, other 
than to note here that he did not argue for a regulatory regime that would tolerate 
collective industrial action. This was so because the coercive disciplinary powers 
necessary to enforce solidarity between workers was, in his view, incompatible with 
the moral freedom of the individual worker.
3
  
 
The Challenge of the Employment Relationship 
 
The question whether and, if so how, the employment market should be regulated had 
become a pressing problem. The old system, under which most wage-fixing had been 
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left to the magistracy, had fallen into desuetude.
4
  As the eighteenth century had 
progressed, workers had begun to organise to ensure that the rewards of society were 
distributed more generously to the working classes. Societies undertaking collective 
bargaining to press for higher wages and shorter working hours flourished until 
Parliament blocked their activities by passing the Combination Acts of 1799 and 
1800.  By criminalising combinations of workers, the legislation ‘atomised’ the 
workforce, compelling works to deal with their employers as individuals. This 
weakened their bargaining power and thus their ability to influence employers to pay 
more.   
 
Much of Coleridge’s early poetry was, of course, concerned with the problems 
of economic hierarchy.
5
  The Pantisocratic emigration project, which was conceived 
partly as a response to  the corrupting forces of capitalism,  proposed amongst its core 
convictions the notion that property  was power; that poverty doomed its victims to 
powerlessness;  that rational benevolence could only be achieved within  family and 
community; and that government hindered moral progression.
6
  But this highly 
constrained conception of the state did not endure in Coleridge’s thought. By the time 
he re-published The Friend in 1818 Coleridge believed that the state has a legitimate 
interest in the employment relationship
7
- an argument that he had stated in Lay 
Sermons in 1817.
8
  Whilst he was by then able to welcome the industrial 
achievements and economic benefits of a successful commercial nation, he concluded 
that continuing social injustice exposed the established order to the risk of popular 
revolt.
9
  Whilst rising aggregate wealth was welcome, it could not excuse the harm 
inflicted on the casualties of the new economic system, most particularly the working 
poor and unemployed who bore the brunt of unrestrained classical liberalism. Lay 
Sermons is Coleridge’s project to save capitalism from the angry mob by alleviating 
its excesses. But how did he imagine the constitutional status of the employment 
relationship? What, if any, aspects of the employment relationship should the state 
regulate? 
 
Progressive Politics
10
 
 
Coleridge’s anxiety about potential revolutionary upheaval derived from his 
observation of unbridled laissez faire liberalism, or as he dubbed it, the overbalance 
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of the commercial spirit.
11
 This ‘overbalance’ arose from the uncompromising pursuit 
of wealth and the public policies that underpinned it. He was anxious that the new 
power relationships between capital and labour had rekindled discontent and 
‘..plunged a peasantry ….into pauperism step for step with the rise in the farmer’s 
profits and indulgencies’.12  The rising wealth of the more advantaged social groups 
thus coincided with declining living standards amongst the poorest.  High 
unemployment and low pay signalled that some but not all ‘boats’ were being lifted 
on the economic tide. 
 
Coleridge realised that wages would have to rise, but this was not the public 
policy lesson that government had derived from inequality and suffering.   Malthus’s 
popular treatise expounding the iron law of law wages
13
 persuaded both government 
and employers that pay rises would merely result in higher staple food prices and in 
rapid population growth.  Not only would this growth exceed the capacity of the 
cultivatable land to feed the population, but the excess supply of labour would 
eventually drive wages back to subsistence levels.
14
 Raising wages would thus 
encourage an increase in population without helping the poor.  Low pay was 
unavoidable; and any policy addressing poverty that involved enhancing welfare 
payments could also be condemned as tending to produce the same results as wage 
increases.
15
    
 
Malthus’s conclusion, which governments accepted, was that employment 
providing below-subsistence pay was not a problem that government could address, 
because policy intervention would ultimately be fruitless.
16
 The Census Act 1800 
strongly signalled government’s faith in Malthusian economics. Rather than 
addressing the problem of low wages policy makers’ attention shifted to counting the 
population, albeit that there were, in some regions, limited improvements to the public 
welfare system.
17
  In general, public policy blamed the feckless poor as the architects 
of their own miseries. 
 
In Lay Sermons, Coleridge argued that the profit-motive, combined with the 
influence of Malthusian empiricism, posed particular threats to the moral order.  He 
saw that the new economic logic ruthlessly failed to distinguish persons and things.
18
  
Human beings and machines had alike become deployable to generate maximum 
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profit:  either could be discarded when more efficient opportunities arose.   
He recalled how Scottish people had been driven from their homes to make way for 
more profitable sheep; entire communities of Scots, whose families had for centuries 
derived their livelihoods from a locality, had been swept off the land because their 
removal meant a more handsome profit for the landowner.
19
  Similarly, where 
children presented symptoms of malnutrition during food shortages, Coleridge found 
it an insufficient response that, at the aggregate level, prosperity was returning.
20
  
Policy-making that was influenced by selfish individualism and underpinned by 
Malthusian economics could not legitimize an intolerable disregard for the suffering 
of the most vulnerable. Coleridge’s response can be read as a study both of the 
requirement for - and the implications of - active, compassionate citizenship in a 
laissez-faire economy. 
 
 
Laissez-faire and the Public/Private Divide 
    
Laissez-faire’s core assumption is that freedom can only be attained in the absence of 
regulatory restrictions. From about 1800 this ideology permeated the development of 
the Common law, which played a critical role in institutionalising disadvantage.
21
   
The re-modelling of Contract law was carefully designed to separate legal doctrine 
from politics and morality.  Rather than using the law to remove exploitation, the 
precarious existence and economic vulnerability of the labouring classes were being 
entrenched by newly re-cast legal principles that shifted economic power away from 
them.  
 
When Coleridge published The Friend and Lay Sermons the English Law of 
Contract had become engaged in a revolution from which modern Contract law 
derives.   John J. Powell published the first systematic treatise on English Contract 
law in 1790. His Essay Upon the Law Contracts and Agreements
22
 stated that 
contracts were binding because of mutual consent.  This was founded on the ‘will 
theory’ of contract, which holds that the dominant consideration in assessing the 
validity of a contract is the agreement of the parties, not the fairness of the bargain.  It 
followed that Powell would condemn equitable concerns with substantive justice or 
fairness because, in his view, overturning unfair contracts resulted in arbitrary 
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decision-making that was inconsistent with the Rule of Law. Powell was not alone in 
his thinking.  Robert Pothier’s Treatise on the Law of Obligations,23 which was 
translated and introduced to English lawyers by William Evans in 1806, was also 
rooted in will theory. It became dominant in shaping the direction of Contract law in 
the nineteenth century and provided the very foundations of our modern Law of 
Contract. These influential treatises meant that law became concerned only with rules 
for ensuring 'free' competitive dealing, and for preserving and enforcing the reality of 
agreement.
24
  
 
The consequence was that, as Contract law developed after about 1800, it 
would not normally protect the defenceless. This mattered because contract underpins 
the employment relationship, often a relationship of inequality in which the employer 
holds greater bargaining power than the employee. If an employee agreed to serve a 
master who paid less than subsistence wages, the contract between them was valid 
and enforceable at law.
25
  The Common law was content to uphold as contractually 
valid whatever impoverishing wages their workers could be persuaded to agree. 
Coleridge saw that employers seized the opportunity presented by the high 
unemployment in 1816-17 to use contractual power to drive down wages, because 
they had no incentive to pay more when there was an abundance of workers willing to 
work cheaply and the burden of subsistence was supported by welfare.   
 
In the Lay Sermons Coleridge attacked the paradigm of selfishness in contract-
making as deflecting economic actors from moral concerns. He complained:  
‘..whether the persons [I contract with] are benefited or no,  is no concern of mine.’26  
Coleridge’s sentiment that it ought to be a concern now encountered an implacable 
foe in the emerging corpus of contractual doctrine.     
 
Positive Duty 
 
To redress the vulnerability of the labouring poor Coleridge thought that the 
public/private divide had to be confronted.  He argued that the state has a positive 
duty to make ‘the means of subsistence more easy to each individual.’27  He described 
the minimum as follows:  ‘in addition to the necessaries of life he (i.e. the worker) 
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should derive from the union and division of labour a share of the comforts and 
conveniences which humanize and ennoble his nature’.28   
 
I shall refer to this as the state’s primary positive duty.  By taking this position 
Coleridge was asserting that the state had an interest in the moral and pecuniary health 
of each individual.  Coleridge chose the word ‘humanize’ with care, because 
minimum material security was essential to the identity of the labourer as a moral 
being. This formulation of the state’s duty also discloses something of Coleridge’s 
theory of re-distribution. Coleridge is an advocate for the promotion of human dignity 
and not mere survival;   his rationalisation of what might conveniently be termed a 
minimally decent life requires the promotion of a minimum threshold of healthy 
subsistence and social participation.
29
 
 
But this is not all.  In Coleridge’s schema the state’s primary positive duty is 
not merely an exhortation to adjust the income of workers, which might occur by 
enhancing the welfare system; rather, Coleridge explicitly recognised that, as a core 
function of the state, government should prevent the employers’ advantage-taking that 
resulted in wages that could not support the workers’ minimum comforts of life 
(however defined). How was this to be achieved? It is important to answer this 
question in order to assess Coleridge’s achievement in proposing realisable, practical 
public policies to address the problems he identified. 
 
 
Counter-balancing a Zeal for Markets 
 
Coleridge recognised that classical economic liberalism eroded the public’s 
acceptance that an irreducible minimum of fundamental material interests belongs to 
all citizens.  Lay Sermons, as Coleridge’s response to the shifts in government 
ideology, economic policy and public discourse, is a complex treatise. Its 
prescriptions for the alleviation of poverty imagine responsibilities of both state and 
individual. It first presented a thesis in which controlling market excess is essentially 
privatised; in other words, the task of moderating the capacity of markets to cause 
injustice is conceived as a function performed by individuals who have been educated 
to act virtuously.   
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Coleridge explicitly identified three necessary ‘counterbalances to the 
mercantile spirit’:30 first, a conception of real property that carried duties which, 
properly performed, were capable of social transformation. In Coleridge’s thought, 
property owners should be burdened with responsibilities akin to those of a trustee 
towards the disadvantaged, which meant their responsibilities were to ensure, as 
Coleridge stated it,  a healthy and civically responsible tenantry. Coleridge did not 
unambiguously disclose whether a failure to fulfil these responsibilities could result in 
a legal claim against the owner, but the tenor of his argument was that the duties owed 
were moral rather than normative.  If so, Coleridge did not regard it as necessary to 
reform the various legal and equitable property rights pertinent to the possession of 
land in order to ensure the delivery of social goods to the community. This matters, 
and is considered further below.  The fulfilment by landowners of their 
responsibilities would only protect those who worked on the large estates, rather than 
those employed in factories. This is why, for the latter class of worker, the contractual 
relationship between employer and employee as opposed to the moral duties on 
landowners by virtue of their ownership of real property becomes of central interest 
and is considered below.   
 
The second Coleridgean ‘counterbalance’ on markets was aimed at 
diminishing the influence of the hegemonic Malthusian empiricism. Philosophic 
inquiry practised by an accredited, learned and philosophic class should permeate 
public and private discourse in order to counter the damaging priority accorded to 
utility and efficiency.  The final restraint arose from the proselytising influence of the 
Christian evangelist.  
 
In his own times, Coleridge despaired that these bulwarks of social justice 
were either attenuated or, worse still, entirely absent from British society.  He wrote: 
‘We have found the first [the duties of the landowner] decaying, the second [the 
philosophic class] not existing.’31   What of the third, religion? Coleridge concluded 
that the likely influence of religion in moderating markets was diluted because 
contemporary religious practices required insufficient attention to be accorded to 
inward reflection and the diligent study of scripture. Rather than becoming 
ameliorating influences he found that persons holding religious belief were astute in 
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commercial life and, by implication, defenders of its core assumptions.  This led 
Coleridge somewhat despairingly to conclude that this misguided, unreflective faith 
re-inforced rather than moderated the hegemony of markets.
32
 
 
Coleridge therefore recognised that his trinity of moderating influences would 
not be sufficiently radical.  On the subject of the public/private divide he observed 
that ‘the spirit of commerce is itself capable of being at once counteracted and 
enlightened by the spirit of the State, to the advantage of both.’33 His concluding 
remarks in Lay Sermons ultimately welcome a role for the public, regulatory role of 
Parliament. ‘Our manufacturers’, he asserted, ‘must consent to regulations…’34   
 
Whilst this injunction does not specify why only manufacturing should be 
regulated, or precisely what industrial activities should be regulated, or even the kind 
of regulation that he has in mind, and whether it extended to guaranteed minimum 
wages,  it is evident that social improvement could not be realised within the private 
realm alone.  
 
Elsewhere in his work Coleridge also hints at the desirability of a judge-made  
re-conceptualisation of contract that could perform a transformative role in the 
employment relationship. The problem is that each of these possible avenues for 
reform, (statute on the one hand and a reconceptualised model of the employment 
contract on the other) is obscured in an incompletely theorised manifesto.  Neither 
The Friend nor Lay Sermons disclose any explicit appeal either to Parliament for a 
code of mandatory minimum wages, or to the courts for a re-fashioning of contract to 
embrace moral concerns including, but not limited to, fair pay. To what extent are 
these possibilities nascent in his arguments in these texts? Why did Coleridge hesitate 
in making his contentions and their consequences explicit? 
 
Coleridge and Contract Law 
 
Coleridge’s encounter with the Law of Contract which, as stated above, is the 
foundation of the employment relationship, arose from an unexpected source. In The 
Friend  he wanted to argue that, despite not implementing the strict terms of Article X 
para 4 of the Definitive Treaty of Amiens, 1802, which required British troops to 
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leave Malta,  Britain had not breached the Treaty. The problem Coleridge faced was 
that under Article X Britain had explicitly agreed to evacuate its troops from the 
Island - an unambiguous and unqualified undertaking that it had steadfastly refused to 
implement.   
 
Coleridge first made the claim that Contract law is rooted in, and requires, 
conscionable behaviour; secondly that the Law of Nations, governing Treaties, shares 
the same principles as the Law of Contract.
35
  Coleridge wrote: 
 
 ‘A Treaty is a writ of mutual promise between two independent States and 
the Law of Promise is the same to nations as to individuals. It is to be 
sacredly performed by each party in that sense in which it knew and permitted 
the other party to understand it, at the time of the contract.’36 (My emphasis) 
 
Although the details of his argument on the Law of Nations need not trouble 
us, it can be noted that Coleridge thought that France could not blame Britain for 
merely adhering to the national security goals of which the French were aware at the 
time of the Treaty.  He concluded:  
 
‘it is…impossible…that any nation can be supposed by any other to have 
intended its own absolute destruction in a treaty, which its interests alone 
could have prompted it to make.’37 Coleridge’s central contention concerning 
the Law of Nations/ Law of Contract was that, when the meaning of an 
agreement was disputed, no contracting party could insist on a meaning 
contrary to that which they allowed the other party to understand.  In other 
words, the meaning of treaties and contracts alike is derived from 
acquiescence and conscionable dealing. He thus accorded a priority to moral 
values extraneous to the formal words used to record the agreement. The 
literally understood language of the agreement should not govern the outcome 
of a dispute about the instrument’s meaning. It was the understanding of the 
parties that mattered, not the words of an agreement. 
 
A normative requirement for conscionable dealing is likely to have extended 
in Coleridge's thought beyond the court’s interpretive function so as to embrace other 
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areas of Contract law.  For example, Coleridge would be acting inconsistently if he 
contended that one party could be free to act unconscionably by offering misleading 
information to induce the other party to enter a contract that the latter would have 
declined had they known the true facts. Conscionable dealing, in Coleridge’s thought, 
can be understood as a general requirement within the Law of Contract/Law of 
Nations.  
 
Coleridge’s ideas thus present significant potential for re-shaping the 
employment contract. If an enforceable promise is identified in some conception of 
conscionable dealing rather than literal expression, Coleridge’s argument opened the 
possibility of setting aside unconscionably harsh terms. Just as a nation could not be 
understood to have signed away its existence, so a labourer could not be thought to 
have agreed to suffer only starvation wages. This follows from his central premise 
that the Law of Nations and the Laws of Contract stand in pari passu.  
 
The prospect of judicial intervention to prevent one of the parties acting 
unconscionably in exploiting the other presented Coleridge with a potentially rich 
opportunity to subject unbridled laissez-faire in the labour market to a requirement 
that conscionable dealing may require minimum standards in pay.  It was open to him 
to argue that whenever contracts providing for below-subsistence wages could be 
condemned as unconscionable, they should be set aside.   
 
But there are a number of difficulties with Coleridge’s essay. The first 
concerns whether Coleridge’s statement of Law of Contract was accurate at the time 
he wrote The Friend.    
 
Fairness in the Interpretation of Contracts 
 
As we have seen, the Common law created Contract law to perform an economic and 
political function.  Political ideology determined how far the courts would interfere 
with the outcomes of a written agreement; legal doctrine disguised this political 
choice.  This approach meant that the outcomes of the negotiation (if any) expressed 
in the written agreement were deemed to be fair. Enforcing agreements  served the 
interests of justice, even if the bargain was not genuinely negotiated and merely 
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reflected the interests of the dominant party.  A contract of employment offering 
below subsistence wages was legally as valid as any other. 
 
Two examples from the case law of Coleridge’s era will demonstrate how 
committed the courts were to the literalist approach.  These leading precedents are 
important because they unambiguously disclose that Coleridge misstated the law at 
the time he wrote.   
In Mansell v Burredge
38
  two former tenants of a farm were each accused of 
neglecting the repair of farm fences. Whilst disputing their individual responsibility, 
they had agreed jointly and severally to perform an independent adjudicator’s award. 
If applied literally the words jointly and severally meant that each of them could be 
personally responsible for the entire sum awarded to the plaintiff, even if the 
adjudicator decided that each former tenant was only responsible for the share they 
incurred during their own period of occupation.  Determining their respective shares 
of blame was, of course, the very purpose of going to arbitration, so neither would 
have intended to be subject to joint and several liability if they had understood the 
significance of those contractual words.  If Coleridge had been correct, the 
understanding of the parties rather than the literal meaning words used would have 
prevailed: but the court held otherwise.  
Lord Kenyon CJ candidly conceded that, ‘(t)his is a rather hard case on these 
two tenants’; but it was the strict, literal terms of the agreement, rather than  their 
common understanding of it that the court upheld. This is, of course, in direct conflict 
with Coleridge’s assertions in The Friend. 
A literal interpretation of the contract, as opposed to the parties’ mutual 
understanding of its purpose, also prevailed in Gerrard v Clifton.
39
 In this case a 
contract was intended to ensure that a plaintiff, who owned several collieries, would 
share in the proceeds of the sale of coal extracted by the lessee who operated the 
mines. The agreement stated that the owner was to have a share of the proceeds from 
the sale of coal sold at the pit head.  As time went by some coal was no longer sold in 
this way, so the owner brought an action to recover a sum reflecting the amount that 
the volume of coal would have made if it had been sold at the pithead. The owner’s 
action failed because the court’s interpretation of the contract meant that he was only 
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entitled to share in the proceeds of coal actually sold at the pithead rather than the 
proceeds of sales concluded elsewhere. This literal interpretation undermined one of 
the major commercial purposes of the contract; moreover, it allowed the tenant, with 
the approval of the court, to evade a moral obligation.
40
   
Coleridge’s statement of the law on the judicial approach to interpreting 
contracts was thus inaccurate. There was no requirement for a conscionable meaning 
where the literal words of the contract allowed one party to act otherwise. 
Coleridge’s Understanding of Contract Law 
Coleridge’s essay on the Law of Nations may, of course, be understood as a political 
intervention rather than a legal treatise: his purpose was both to salvage national 
honour and to justify what might have been seen in diplomatic circles as British 
duplicity in its dealings with France.  However, his decision unnecessarily to invoke 
Contract law to support his case, when it so obviously undermined it, is perplexing- 
all the more so when  he was well aware of the ample case-law emanating from the 
Courts of Vice-Admiralty to support him in his argument concerning the 
interpretation of international agreements.
41
  
Ignorance of Contract law might explain his lapse; but this possibility is 
unconvincing when it is recalled that Coleridge had for many years been familiar with 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. He had, for example, quoted 
from Blackstone as early as 1795.
42
 An alternative explanation should therefore be 
admitted.   He seems to have been concerned to remind the reader that the Law of 
Contract had not always been as it had become at the in final years of the eighteenth 
century.  His work can be read as advocating a return to the Contract law 
jurisprudence of the previous century, which was very different from that promoting 
competitive individualism that had since emerged.  
As Morton Horwitz later concluded, the ‘law [for the greater part of the 
eighteenth century] was conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic, and 
above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of the community.’43  Contract 
law’s concern had once been to impose an objectively just moral order.  Until the 
close of the eighteenth century the Chancery Court set aside contracts that were 
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judged to be examples of unfair advantage-taking. These interventions were based on 
a very different conception of what constituted unfair advantage-taking than that 
which had replaced it by the time Coleridge wrote The Friend.  Thus it is possible that 
Coleridge’s thought was drawing on an earlier conception of Contract law rather than 
the re-modelled version. 
Two examples of the old Chancery jurisprudence are illustrative of how 
conceptions of permissible advantage-taking had altered, and these furnish support for 
Coleridge’s argument in The Friend. In Heathcote v Paignon44 the purchaser of an 
annuity had paid two-thirds below what the court termed the ‘real’ value and one fifth 
below the market price.  This evidence allowed the court to infer that the purchaser 
had acted opportunistically by taking advantage of the distress of the plaintiff.  The 
contract was set aside. 
It was likewise in restraint of trade cases.  Where, for example, a baker who 
sold a business bound himself not to compete in the same parish as the business sold 
to the purchaser the non-competition agreement was enforceable only if the agreed 
price or consideration for the sale of the business was adequate, valuable and fair.
45
 
Equity judges reasoned that gross inadequacy of the consideration for a contract (in 
crude terms, the price received under the contract) could only be explained where the 
recipient was either misled or the victim of an abuse of power. Either required the 
intervention of the law in its protective role.  
When Coleridge re-asserted the principle that Contract law was rooted in 
conscionable dealing, his argument aligned with  the former jurisprudence.  This 
earlier case-law might have provided him in Lay Sermons with the armoury he 
required to advocate and develop a more compromising model of laissez-faire 
individualism, which infused contract law with moral principle. It would have 
allowed him to suggest that, consistent with principle, the owner/employer’s rights 
arising from a contract of employment should be on a par with a land owner's 
possession of real property; in other words, possession of land and the Law of 
Contract were alike informed by moral duties to ensure minimum standards of well-
being of the tenant or employee respectively. The potential to revive the old Chancery 
jurisprudence can be imagined as a further and forceful counterbalance to the trinity 
of property, religion, and philosophy. But whereas real property rights were not to be 
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re-shaped to make normative the landowner’s moral duties, a re-shaping of Contract 
law in the form of a return to the former equitable jurisprudence was a possible 
element of Coleridge’s prescription for reform. 
 
Statute 
In Lay Sermons, Coleridge presented the case for regulation as an alternative means of 
addressing the plight of factory workers without making explicit what regulations 
were required. Statutory intervention, like the potential of the Common law discussed 
above, would also recognise that the employment relationship is not simply a matter 
of private agreement. 
As a matter of general principle, Coleridge did not favour statutory 
intervention to address social ills.  Statutory law was ill-suited to a programme of 
social reform owing to its weakness in differentiating between the merits of individual 
cases. Moreover, the state’s enforcement powers were generally sufficiently weak for 
many malefactors to escape justice. Enacting new statutory obligations would not by 
itself cure the targeted ills. An individual’s decision to act according to moral 
responsibility was potentially more effective.   
In a letter to Daniel Stuart
46
 he cautioned against approaching complex and 
diverse social relationships with a single panacea, because the outcomes were often 
more oppressive than the problem the legislature sought to address. Accordingly, he 
famously wrote that 
 ‘the object of a Governor…[is]to preserve the Freedom of all by coercing 
within the requisite bounds the freedom of each.  Whatever a Government 
does more than this, comes of evil: and its best employment is the repeal of 
Laws and Regulations, not the Establishment of them…… the shortest code 
of law is the best.’47  
This did not mean, however, that the coercive power of legislation could never 
play a role in social reform. If private contracting produced morally unacceptable 
outcomes that allowed the dominant persons to curtail the freedom of others, 
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Coleridge conceded that statute should properly regulate. He made this case for 
legitimate regulation during the public debate concerning Sir Robert Peel’s proposed 
legislation to curb the working hours of child labour in manufacturing.   
One consequence of the private realm conception of contractual power was 
that it allowed employers to engage children under the age of nine years for factory 
work. These children could be required to work in excess of twelve hours a day for 
seven days a week.
48
 Peel’s Bill, which eventually became law in 1819, had the 
modest aim of preventing the employment of children under the age of nine years in 
factories and restricted the maximum working hours of those aged between nine and 
sixteen years. Despite its modest ambitions the Cotton Mills and Factories Bill, 1818 
proved to be controversial, because it placed on public trial the ideological project of 
how the private realm was being framed. 
The Bill met with ferocious resistance from mill owners on the grounds inter 
alia that it was illegitimate for the state to interfere in voluntary arrangements freely 
entered into by the parties.  They asserted a negative conception of liberty that 
imagined freedom as freedom from the intrusion of state-inspired regulation.  
Children who did not choose to work long hours in mills were not compelled to do so. 
This argument asserted that the power to engage and regulate labour under 
employment contracts resided firmly in the private sphere into which the state should 
no longer venture.  Furthermore, it could be proved that the long hours of factory 
work did not cause ill-health amongst the child workers.  Empirical arguments thus 
aligned with the principles of laissez-faire.   
 
The dispute that  divided the reformers, who supported the Bill, from the 
advocates of the laissez faire status quo was essentially one concerning the nature of 
freedom.    Reformers, such as Coleridge, recognised that positive liberty required the 
intervention of the state to empower individuals to live moral and civilised lives.  
Coleridge’s main thrust rejected empiricism as the basis for social reform.49  In other 
words, evidence that the childrens’ health was not impaired by factory conditions did 
not make a convincing case for the status quo.  The incessant servitude of their terms 
of hiring meant that the children’s social identity had been reduced to that of 
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productive machines.  Rather than promoting liberty, the unmoderated laissez-faire in 
the factory system undermined human freedom and human well-being.      
 
If the state was to fulfil its primary positive duty in relation to wages the case 
for the statutory minimum wage was arguably stronger than it was for Peel’s factory 
reform. Excessively low pay forced families to rely on welfare because employers had 
no incentive to pay more when the burden of subsistence was provided from poor 
relief.  This created the moral problem that farmers and others were benefiting from 
the profits from labour that was partly funded by ratepayers.
50
   Taxation removed 
from those taxpayers the opportunity to choose how their income was spent and, 
according to Malthus at least, was economically harmful. Thus, both moral and 
empirical arguments combined to make the case for some version of a statutory 
minimum wage. 
 
Coleridge did not, however, explicitly advocate a statutory minimum wage 
policy, notwithstanding that it would be consistent with his argument that economic 
freedom cannot be asserted in ways that harm others. Thus Coleridge might be read as 
an author who was open either to the contractual or statutory reform of wages, but 
whose work failed unambiguously to advocate a fully reasoned case for either.  We 
need to ask, why?  
 
Morality and the Limits of Law 
At the time he wrote The Friend Coleridge may not have completely thrown over his 
belief that freedom could not convincingly be delivered through public institutions – a 
conviction harboured since his Pantisocracy days.  If freedom assumed individual 
agency it also assumed that individuals retained the freedom to act according to 
conscience.  His strategy for reform therefore lay in educating individuals towards 
virtuous behaviour in all their dealings. Social transformation ultimately depended on 
the transformation of the self: individuals should actively exert themselves to develop 
and act according to their moral conscience - a voluntary, informed performance of 
civic duty. 
 17 
Coleridge’s theory of morality was firmly rooted in a transcendental idea of 
the Reason that should be theologically informed and enjoy a relationship with the 
Divine. Humans, he wrote, ‘are born with the god-like faculty of Reason, … it is the 
business of life to develope (sic) and apply it’.51 Critically, however, the test for moral 
action was not the outward act but the internal motivation of actions.
52
 Thus 
Coleridge’s moral theory in The Friend does not require political actors or individuals 
to address suffering and inequality.
53
 It merely advocated an inward transformation of 
the individual to provide the necessary conditions for the conscience and morally 
informed behaviour. Being driven by the law to contribute to an enlightened society 
did not satisfy Coleridge’s understanding of the spiritual or transcendental nature of 
morality, because the individual should act out of purer, voluntary motives rather than 
in response to the coercive power of the state. Moreover, Coleridge’s rejection of a 
consequentialist version of morality meant that dutiful behaviour was not readily 
amenable to codification; in other words, how an individual should act morally when 
any given predicament arose could lead to different outcomes, since different 
responses could each be morally legitimate.  
 
Conclusion 
In Lay Sermons Coleridge’s ambition was to present a model for the reform of liberal 
markets that was more responsive to his moral concern with social welfare. He 
succeeded in reminding readers that an irreducible minimum of fundamental material 
interests belongs to us all. Regrettably, the content of these minimum social rights is 
not fully explored in his work. Although his conception of the role of the state in 
employment relations is also under-theorised, his project nevertheless reminds us that 
social justice requires a sophisticated inter-relationship between public and private 
initiative. Whilst he unambiguously asserted that the state is legitimately interested in 
the outcomes of individual wage settlements, his apparent qualms about the available 
public policy tools in achieving this policy goal arguably blunted his attack on the 
public/private divide. His readership might, perhaps, have been disappointed not to 
discover a richer and more fully developed public policy manifesto.   
 18 
However, his ideas cannot for that reason be dismissed. Coleridge’s central 
argument rejects empiricism as the dominant metric by which public policy in 
employment relations should be assessed.  He encourages us to interrogate policies 
and outcomes from a moral perspective that is antagonistic to those who regard 
economic growth as the overriding, or even the exclusive, criterion of success.  
Coleridge’s suggestion that the employment relationship is a site in which all 
individuals should perform their social, personal and religious duties is particularly 
pertinent in our era. His apparent conviction that the contractual principles 
underpinning the employment relationship should also be re-cast to reflect moral 
concerns is also an important contribution that English courts have only recently 
begun to explore.
54
  
 
Coleridge’s work also presents the possibility that when national governments, 
which are constrained by globalised markets, are either unable or unwilling to pursue 
progressive, redistributive policies the encouragement of individuals to virtuous 
action might prove to be one of the last remaining responses for achieving socially 
transformative action.   This urges us to investigate The Friend and Lay Sermons to 
reinvigorate an urgently required debate about the nature of both corporate and 
individual citizenship and thereby to remind ourselves that the maximisation of 
overall utility (assessed in terms of orthodox economic analysis) is not necessarily the 
exclusive measure of a successful, “good” society. 
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